Charting the rise and fall of the Grow More Food programme in India, this article explores a set of tensions that characterised development policies in the first decade after independence in India. The postcolonial Indian state staked its legitimacy on securing economic independence for India, and, in particular, on being able to feed its citizens without resorting to importing food. The transition to food independence, however, was fraught and contested. In particular, this piece argues, the plans to get the nation to Grow More Food as part of this drive towards national self-sufficiency were marked by a conflict between the dream of providing the benefits of development to all Indians and the reality that independent India's resources were extremely limited. In addition, this transition also involved a transformation in the nature of nationalism. The ruling Indian National Congress struggled to formulate a postcolonial nationalism because it was torn between using the state for development and urging the people to shape their own destiny outside of the state. It was also deeply ambivalent about rural citizens, who were viewed both as a burden and as a potentially limitless public resource. This article suggests that one of the defining features of postcolonial development was the tension between scientific and democratic development.
This article examines the rise and fall of India's Grow More Food programme in light of existing scholarship on the regime of international development that emerged after the Second World War. In so doing, it explores a set of tensions in the postcolonial development regime that was supposed to secure the legitimacy of India's new rulers. Independent India was certainly incorporated into the post-war international political geography in which underdeveloped territories were to be helped on the path to modernity by international experts, foreign aid and the transfer of technologies.
1 Of course, the conception of India as an underdeveloped country predated the apotheosis of post-war development theory by nearly a century. 2 But having taken over the reins of government in 1947, many of the leaders of postcolonial India accepted the conception of their country as underdeveloped, and most staked their legitimacy on their ability to improve the material conditions of Indians.
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This article questions the received wisdom that has assumed that independent India's first rulers successfully anchored their legitimacy by taking over and expanding upon the development regimes of the late colonial state. Scholars of the rise and fall of modernisation theory have long suggested that colonial and early postcolonial regimes grounded their legitimacy in their promise to bring development to their countries. 4 Simultaneously, they have emphasised the continuities between late-colonial and postcolonial development regimes. 5 Together, the focus on continuity and legitimacy has obscured our view of the transition period surrounding independence. In this time, although there were powerful forces of continuity, India's leaders felt the pressing need to be seen to take the country in new directions. While the country's leaders wagered their legitimacy on their ability to bring development to India, they did not always win this gamble. The research below demonstrates that India's transition to becoming a developmentalist state was trickier than has been acknowledged. The history of the rise and fall of the Grow More Food Programme reveals that this period was characterised by a series of tensions: those between popular action and state-led development; between targeting India's limited resources to a select few and providing the tools of development to all; and between regarding India's rural population as a burden, and seeing it as the nation's only hope for salvation. The difficult transition to economic independence in India was characterised by these conflicts.
Whilst independent India's first rulers inherited the structure of the colonial state, including its development programmes, the transition to independence did entail transformations in the form and function of nationalist politics, which had implications for the country's development programmes. Anti-colonial parties had achieved legitimacy through mass mobilisation against colonial governments, but postcolonial nationalism was largely redirected through the channels of the state. 6 However, the flow of nationalist action was diverted through the state neither instantaneously nor fluidly. Indeed, both Chatterjee and Kaviraj have underscored the ways in which the nationalist takeover of the state gave rise to contradictions between development and democracy in India: each has suggested that the resources needed for a 'rational' and 'unitary' development strategy often were diverted to reward particular groups, especially landlords, for their loyalty in democratic elections.
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These scholars highlight tensions that emerged over how best to use the resources of the state.
This paper, in contrast, argues that the Indian National Congress Party, as well as opposition groups, were torn over the question of whether development ought to be pursued using the newly acquired instruments of the bureaucracy or through the old mechanisms of popular action outside of the state. The pages that follow chart the ways in which the ruling Indian National Congress Party ran up against the limits of postcolonial nationalism as the governments it controlled tried to straddle this divide.
In addition, existing scholarship on transnational development regimes has tended to regard the populations of developing countries primarily as the objects of discursive representations and top-down policy interventions by experts. 8 This article, by contrast, highlights the distinct note of ambivalence found in the relationship between the developmentalist state and the population in India. The experience of the Grow More Food programme suggests that, rather than simply viewing the bulk of the rural population as a burden that had to be lifted into modernity, government officials and members of the urban educated classes had more complex views. At times, officials did indeed regard India's huge rural population as a 'static' multitude who would have to be dragged into modernity. 9 Given India's limited natural and economic resources, however, 'the enthusiasm of the people' was simultaneously regarded as, 'the greatest, and some might feel disposed to say the only, asset which India can count on'. 10 Thus, India's agricultural population was at once both an object to be moulded and a seemingly limitless resource to be tapped. At the heart of this conflict was the question of India's limited resources; this was also at the centre of another tension evident in this period. Without well-developed indigenous educational institutions, a solid economic base, or the surfeit of foreign exchange reserves necessary to manufacture or purchase the human and technological elements essential for a modernising development programme that would cover the whole country, the Government of India was torn between targeting development at select groups, and the promises it had made to improve the life of every Indian. These conflicts shaped the Grow More Food Programme, which was designed as both a national movement and a scientific endeavour.
In order to explore these questions, this research turns to a relatively under-studied area of postcolonial Indian history: the first decade after independence. Until recently, historians had long ignored the first decade after independence. 11 According to the conventional historiography, it was only with the start of the second five year plan (1957) , that Indian leaders, and in particular, India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, developed what Akhil Gupta has called, 'a coherent ideology and strategy of development', which included the establishment of a planned economy aimed at the rapid creation of heavy industries. 12 In this scholarship, the first decade after independence was merely an interregnum in which India waited for the full programme of Nehruvian planning to begin.
Moreover, scholars studying the period before the Green Revolution of the late 1960s have tended to focus on the rhetoric and the promises of the five year plans. 13 As a result, they 14 As a result, the scholarship to date has not captured the uncertainty and flux of these early years.
In an attempt to begin filling these gaps, the research below examines a food crisis that enveloped the country in the first five years after independence. In the same year, the first Grow More Food Programme was launched. It endeavoured to encourage more extensive and intensive cultivation. The first Grow More Food campaign was, in the words of one report, 'improvised in a hurry and under the pressure of compelling events it had naturally to be built up on such knowledge as was readily available and with such resources in trained personnel and material as could be hastily mustered.' 24 By the end of the war, therefore, after more than two years of extending cultivation, emergency irrigation works, manure schemes, seed distribution and other programmes, the government was unable to even proffer an estimate of the increase in production achieved due to the Grow More Food campaign. Indeed, where yields had increased, it was assumed that this was 'made possible largely by the mercy of Providence' in the form of favourable monsoon rains.
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Growing more food was not the only element of the wartime food economy. During the war, governments had introduced procurement by levy, controls on prices and rationing, all of which were designed to acquire food, move it around the country, and ensure that poorer sections of the population had access to food at subsidised prices. However, the range of controls and rationing varied according to the needs of each province. Even in those provinces with extensive food-related bureaucracies, government did not command the entire food economy: rationing covered only food grains and was centred primarily on the most populated urban areas. 26 Even though India operated one of the largest rationing systems in the world, it reached less than one-fifth of all Indians. 27 For the rest of the food economy,
there was the open market or the black market. Given that governments procured food grains at below-market prices, the black market boomed during the war.
28
By the end of the war, India's food situation had eased somewhat, but India's government feared that the country's food supplies were far from secure. and September 1948, price controls and procurement measures were maintained, and rationing was extended for several years. 30 The Grow More Food Programme was extended in September 1946; the following year, as India's first independent government took power, the programme was re-launched and 'placed on a planned basis'.
31
Primarily, placing India's food economy on a 'planned basis' meant fixing for each state and province, 'definite targets for the production of additional food'. 32 Although there were real problems with these statistics, which will be discussed below, the numbers provided were indicating that the government of independent India would have to rely on imports to maintain supply. Buying food abroad was a drain on India's finances, however.
Not only did importing food force the government to use scarce foreign currency reserves to buy goods, but imports were then sold at subsidised prices within India, amplifying the state's losses. Food subsidies alone cost the Government of India Rs20-25 crore per year between 1946 and 1949. 33 At the same time, the Government of India was struggling to control inflation and provide for partition's refugees, while spending nearly half of its budget (and even more of its foreign reserves) on defence as it prepared for war in Kashmir.
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In an attempt to avoid exhausting its foreign reserves, the Government of India announced in mid-1949 that it would import no more food grains after the end of 1951. At the same time, it promised to escalate efforts to produce more food at home. Nehru warned the nation against losing its hard-won independence, telling the population in a radio address: 'If we do not produce enough food for our country, we become dependent upon other countries, 36 Reminding its readers that the Congress Party had promised the people that after achieving swaraj (self-rule), 'they would have no worries over food or employment', the paper warned the Government of India that, 'it should attend to fulfilling the basic needs of the people before the volcano of people's growing unease and disappointment explodes'.
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Food was thus inextricably linked to both the larger questions of economic prosperity and political stability. Food was not just the basic need of a human; it was the basic need of a nation.
It was with this knowledge that the Grow More Food Campaign was re-launched with the drive to self-sufficiency. But the Grow More Food programme was in fact not one but two campaigns: one deployed the tools of a self-styled scientific development planning and functioned through the bureaucracy; the other was conducted on the popular level and placed its faith in the collective power of the people to mould their destiny outside of the state. The division between the two was a symptom of the deep ambivalence at policy level and amongst urban educated classes about the peasants who produced India's food. Announcing the self-sufficiency drive, Nehru had declared that it was not only 'a war against poverty', but also a fight against 'ignorance', a veiled reference to farming techniques that were regularly blamed for the country's low production. 38 More explicitly, the editorial team of Siasat acknowledged that for the programme to succeed, 'the people, the cultivators and the government will have to…cooperate more and more'. But in the same paragraph, the paper bemoaned that Indian cultivators were 'ignorant' and that they were still using the same 'ancient' farming methods that they had been practicing 'since the time of the Great Ashoka'
in the third century BCE. 39 Indian cultivators, the majority of whom were scraping a living on small plots with little access to irrigation, let alone fertilisers or tractors, were paradoxically both a hindrance and one of the only tools at hand to solve India's 'food problem'. In some respects, the Grow More Food campaign was conducted in the manner the ruling Congress Party knew best: it was a nation-wide popular movement in which the people were to be marched into the battle for national self-sufficiency. Indeed, the idea that every citizen had a contribution to make and that the sum of these contributions would be sufficient to make up India's food shortages fell easily into nationalist paradigms. Nehru appealed to every Indian to join the 'crusade for food production', telling them, 'It is a war in which every citizen can be a soldier and can serve his or her country.' 40 Self-sufficiency in food grains readily dovetailed with nationalist concepts of swadeshi (lit. of one's own country, national manufactures), which had been in currency since the early nationalist movement.
A popular campaign for economic independence
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Nehru reminded the nation that Gandhi had urged people to spin their own cloth to fight for economic independence, 'If we can manage without depending on other countries for cloth',
Nehru reasoned, 'why should we do so for food?'
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As both national and provincial schemes were elaborated, all the tools of the nationalist movement were deployed in the cause. Thus, just as they had during anti-British campaigns, Indians (be they cultivators or not) were encouraged to take collective pledges that ran thus:
I shall fully follow in my day-to-day life the orders given by the Provincial Government from time to time in regard to the production of foodstuffs and their saving, and shall advise others to do the same. … I shall use coarse foodgrains [sic] in my daily meals I shall use the least amount of rice conveniently possible I shall regularly devote a part of my time in work, either connected with production of food or its saving; I shall devote all my energies and resources in the production of foodstuffs, especially grains (this is only for those who cultivate land). 43 As they had been in anti-colonial campaigns, volunteers would be important in this movement too. They were 'to go into the villages, and take active measures' to see that the schemes for growing more food were 'taken up on as large a scale as possible. 47 Imagining a nation, however, was not the same as feeding one. As most Congress leaders were more adept at pageantry than agriculture, many of these schemes were neither comprehensive nor coherent. For example, 'compost week' collapsed in the follow-through:
although municipal corporations in Madras had spent much needed funds to make compost, cultivators refused to buy it because 'the cost of transporting compost from the town to the farms in the villages was prohibitive.' 48 In neighbouring Hyderabad, the government made 91,000 maunds 49 As one can see, some of these popular efforts were also 'scientific' in their orientation. Hence, hundreds of wells were drilled, fertilisers and improved varieties of seed were made available for purchase, and hundreds of thousands of rupees were loaned to farmers to help them buy these items. 54 It was at the intersection of the scientific and popular sides of the campaign that the tensions within it were most apparent. There was immense pressure on India's new leaders to provide such scientific benefits to all cultivators, but the government did not have the funds to make them available to everyone. For their part, farmers were reluctant to spend what little funds they had on one element, such as improved seeds, without access to the other elements, irrigation and fertilisers. And they were wary of spending money to increase production only to have it taken away by the government levy, and so in many cases simply chose not to take up the schemes at all. Indeed, many of the endeavours undertaken between 1947 and 1952 had little appeal for the rural population. The pledge to 'use coarse foodgrains in my daily meals' and 'fully follow in my day-to-day life the orders given by the Provincial Government' promised neither the excitement of defying the law nor the drama of 'do or die' which had characterised the anti-British struggle.
Scientific efforts towards a planned food economy
The ostensibly more scientific, government-run aspect of the campaign was conducted by governments for citizens, cultivators and consumers. It was concerned with gathering information to be deployed by governments to make the best use of India's limited food it proved difficult to find the technical personnel necessary to conduct research 56 or to survey existing storage infrastructure to assess where losses were being suffered due to infestation. 57 As the drive to put food production on a planned footing took shape, it necessitated the gathering and production of new types of knowledge. The centre thus demanded standardised weekly, fortnightly and yearly reports on various aspects of food production, from rainfall, and expected yields, 58 to the amount of food lost due to infestation of storage facilities. 59 As Grow More Food programmes got underway, the Centre called for standardised information on, for example, how many acres had been planted with improved varieties of seed. 60 For each crop, governments were asked to gather figures on the target for production, actual production, the increase in production, and the amount of surplus or deficit of the crop in the state. 61 This type of data was designed to make India's food supply calculable and therefore controllable. 62 This was, of course, a part of larger global changes in which knowledge about land use and food production began to be enclosed as a field for specialists, and these experts' understanding of food changed significantly. 63 These developments were accompanied by an increased demand for statistics for deployment in comparative analysis of provinces and nations, and for use in political arguments. New knowledge about calories and vitamins that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century was designed to detach food from its cultural context (at least in the minds of policy-makers), and transform it into a universal, 'material instrument of statecraft.' 64 Thus, a planned food economy meant knowing how much food was available, acquiring surplus produce and moving it into areas where there was a deficit before scarcity could strike. Reliable production statistics and an efficient procurement regime, it was believed, would provide the foundation for food planning. Throughout the duration of the relaunched Grow More Food Programme, however, the lament repeatedly arose that the statistics available to government were unreliable. The central government relied on provinces for data, and provinces received their information from patwaris (village-level revenue officials), who, in turn, asked farmers for their production levels. In this system, there was an intrinsic incentive for cultivators to deliberately under-report their food production. The system of government procurement at below-market prices, coupled with a vibrant black market, provided a strong incentive for farmers to avoid consigning their produce to government through the levy, and to sell it instead where they could earn the highest margins. And this was no secret. On the production side, in some sections there was sympathy with cultivators who resorted to the black market: 'life gets dearer day by day',
Siasat noted, and 'the poor classes are prevented from gaining profits' by the system of procurement. 'They run to the black market not so that they might amass money and become rich', but rather, the paper explained, simply in order to 'fulfil their daily needs'. 65 On the consumption side, one estimate suggested that, 'It would be an understatement to say that nine out of ten persons who can afford it traffics in the black-market in foodgrains [sic] .' 66 As a result, it was agreed that inaccuracy must have been a defining feature of food statistics at this time: Nehru believed, 'It may be taken for granted' that the reports patwaris submitted were 'incorrect'. 67 According to the Prime Minister, 'The result of all this is that we grope in the dark.' 68 Blame could not be pinned on cultivators and patwaris alone. Centrally, increased production was measured by assuming that applying manure to land, or planting improved varieties of seed would multiply yields by a fixed amount. Estimates for increased production were reached by multiplying, for example, the number of acres that were put under manure for the first time by a constant that was calculated centrally, rather than measured in the field.
In some cases extra yield was over-estimated; in others it was under-estimated. 69 Equally, provinces had no reason to report their real levels of food production, even if they did know them because the system of redistribution between surplus and deficit areas took the form of bargaining between the central government and provincial governments. 70 The Englishlanguage paper, The Statesman, described the annual Food Ministers' Conference as a 'curious struggle' in which 'States pitch their demands as high as possible while the Centre tries to bring them down'. 71 Munshi acknowledged that because of this, 'the surplus units are not too anxious to disclose their real surplus nor are the deficit units anxious to disclose the real deficit'. 72 The poor foundation of India's plan to end food imports was a subject of derision in the press. After Munshi's admission that statistics regarding production and consumption were 'not accurate', the Hindustan Standard mocked the plan to end imports:
'While thus our supply and requirement remain unknown quantities, we are planning to make the entire country self-sufficient in respect of food in course of another year. God save us!' 73 This system repeated many of the mistakes of government policy during the Bengal famine, even as the findings about what went wrong in 1943-4 were becoming public knowledge. 74 What was designed to be a symphony of efforts between central and provincial governments turned into a cacophonous row, with many provinces constantly pressing the Centre for a greater allocation of grains. Monthly announcements on the gap between food production and consumption encouraged hoarding, which in turn caused prices to rise. Even if no one had faith in the statistics published, a sense of crisis grew because the production of food ultimately depended on the one thing the government could neither command nor cajole, but which everyone could monitor: the weather.
Hunger, Anger, Doubt
Over the first five years after independence, the weather was not kind to India. In the south, To be sure, there was not an absolute lack of food in India at this time: in Punjab and
Western UP, surplus grain was produced. But citizens in several rural areas of eastern India could not afford to feed themselves in the face of rising prices, in part because many were landless labourers or families owning tiny plots of land. 77 The emergency was a crisis of already marginalised populations being pushed into a position where they could not afford to purchase food. A team from the Delhi School of Economics that visited Bihar in 1951 also concluded that the food crisis was not just a question of scarcity, but of the 'lack of purchasing power' of landless labourers and small farmers.
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Whilst India had tried to adopt the latest mode of calculating food production, the hunger that spread through parts of the young country was not measured using the latest metric, the calorie. Instead, hunger was detected in older ways, by observing patterns of consumption, migration and public unrest. As the summer monsoon failed in 1950, Hyderabad's Raichur District witnessed 'two minor food riots' in June. 79 In August 1950, it was reported that 'people from certain parts of Aurangabad District are migrating…in search of food and employment.' 80 A delegation from the Journalists Association which travelled to Jammu found the conditions in Kishtwar were 'indescribably horrible,' as the people had been reduced to living on wild herbs and grass, whilst most of the cattle population had perished. 81 At the same time, on the opposite side of the country in Bhagalpur, Bihar, it was reported that middle class families were only managing to eat one meal a day whilst 'Poorer classes of people including labourers are finding it difficult to have one full meal in two or three days.' 82 By August 1950, as many as thirty deaths due to starvation had been reported in Bihar. 83 By January the following year, starvation deaths were reported in eastern areas of India's largest state, Uttar Pradesh.
84
Whilst hunger was experienced by only marginalised groups scattered across the land, it was understood as a national problem, for, as one newspaper editorial put it, 'One part of India cannot feast while another part starves'. 85 And, as one year of scarcity rolled into another, the crisis was increasingly pinned on the government and its policies. Together, the two sides of the critique of the Grow More Food Programme amplified the tension between government and popular action. 
From Miss a Meal to Import a Meal
In part, India's leaders responded to the crisis by appealing to national sentiments. Nehru urged provincial governments to start public works to increase the purchasing power of the poorest. The Prime Minister appealed over the radio for Indians who were not going short to 'help by giving up one meal a week' and donating what had not been used to scarcity-stricken areas, and he personally toured Punjab and Western UP asking for donations. 96 His entreaty became known as the Miss a Meal programme and was received with enthusiasm in some parts, especially where the Congress organisation was strongest. Students in the city of Bombay went house to house asking those with ration cards to fill in a form requesting their rations be reduced by one meal per week. Missing a meal for the people of Bihar and Madras was seen as the natural duty of citizens, as the President of 'Hum-Sub' (We-All), an organisation helping with the programme in Bombay affirmed, 'being Indians, it is our duty to see that we send them food'. 97 Villagers of Seyakuva (Sejakua), in the Baroda District of Bombay state promised to fast a full day each week to save food for those in Bihar. 98 The Indian Army donated ten thousand maunds of cereals to the cause. 99 Solving the food crisis was not just a matter of national solidarity, however, it was also a question of political legitimacy for the Congress Party. The food crisis came at the worst possible time for India's democratic leaders, as the country's first general elections were scheduled to begin at the end of 1951. Indeed, far before the elections were held, provincial governments were connecting the need to alleviate food shortages with the Congress' hopes of retaining power in the first elections. 100 In such circumstances, popular action had its limitations. And India's government was forced to turn to the outside world for help. India for the purchase of wheat from over-stuffed American silos. 103 With the arrival of a bumper crop of imports in 1951, the crisis began to abate, though 1952 was not an easy year because the summer monsoon failed again in many parts of the country. 104 However, securing an influx of imports did not end India's difficulties. India's ports and transport network were unable to bear the burden of a huge influx of goods: in many places, trucks could not be obtained to move imported wheat into the interior where it was needed most; in some cases grain was left uncovered on railway platforms as it awaited transport during the monsoon. 105 Where the grain did arrive, it was not always welcome:
wheat, which was the preferred grain of international aid because Western nations had a surplus and it was easy to ship, was not an ordinary part of the rice-based diet in Madras and Eastern Hyderabad, and many refused to eat the imported food grains. 106 declared a 'failure', not only by the opposition and the press, but by sections within the Congress Party as well.
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Conclusion
Until the Green Revolution took hold two decades later, India's poorest citizens suffered food supply crunches whenever the rains failed or prices rose. 109 voices insisted that in a democracy no one ought to be left out of India's anticipated advance.
There were, then, several sides to this issue. Firstly, how was India to make the best use of the state's limited resources? It was impossible, given the limited financial resources at the disposal of the state, to supply every cultivator with all the facilities prescribed by contemporary theories of modernisation. There was strong pressure to provide the benefits of scientific development to all, and equally strong arguments for limiting it to a targeted few.
For much of the first decade after independence, India's first rulers attempted to straddle this contradiction through a mixture of state and popular action. The Grow More Food Enquiry Committee, which reported in 1952 on the nation-wide programme, found that during the Programme resources, such as manure or improved seeds, had been not only been 'spread too thinly', but efforts were not coordinated: 'it was not realised that all aspects of village life are inter-related and improvements could not be split up into a number of detached programmes operating independently.' 110 The Committee recommended that future efforts focus on 'concentrating efforts in intensive areas'. 111 But the final version of the first Five Year Plan government resources ought to be concentrated in selected areas. Instead, during the first Plan government was to act as a 'catalyst' to modernising agriculture by providing seeds, fertilisers and credit to farmers, but 'the very essence of the programme' for agricultural development remained 'people's participation'. 112 The first decade after independence, therefore, was characterised by this tension between limited resources and providing for the whole nation. Because these limited resources were made available to all, but primarily for purchase, those cultivators that were already better off were able to take advantage of government assistance. Finally, because India's first development schemes relied upon popular participation, but were designed to transform rural lives, they evinced a deep ambivalence about rural citizens. Early development programmes in India viewed the rural citizen as both an obstacle and an asset. Cultivators were both a focus of efforts of reform and the nation's best hope for true independence. This contradiction had been inherent in earlier nationalist programmes, but after 1947 it was placed at the centre of the postcolonial state.
